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1. The research problem 
European Union Member States are still taking too long to implement agreed directives into 
national law. There are also far too many infringement cases where Member States are 
incorrectly applying the requirements laid down in the directive. While recognised as a major 
problem that seriously obstructs further European integration, national governments’ 
diverging attitude towards their obligation to comply with Community legislation is still 
poorly understood. By establishing how institutions matter in the process of transposition, it is 
my aim to offer a better theoretical explanation than those advanced thus far for the varying 
degree to which EU Member States deal with Community legislation. So as to achieve this 
objective, I seek to systematically test the rival new-institutional theories to the speed and 
completeness of transposed Community directives. Prior to explaining why Member States 
deviate from the deadline and contents set in a directive, I seek to assess the extent to which 
such deviations have occurred over time. Though academics and EU officials share the view 
that the EU countries’ transposition performance is highly inadequate, Member States’ long-
term transposition records have hardly been evaluated. Accordingly, the main research 
questions my research seeks to answer read  
 
 (1)  To what extent do Member States fail to transpose Community directives timely and 
completely? 
 
(2) What new-institutional theory is best able to explain why Member States fail to 
transpose Community directives timely and completely into national law?
 
1.1 Transposition deficit: a matter of interpretation 
Article 249 of the EC Treaty lays down that the European Parliament acting jointly with the 
Council, the Council and the Commission shall, in order to carry out their task and in 
accordance with the provisions of the EC Treaty, make regulations and issue directives, take 
decisions, make recommendations or deliver opinions1. Amid these formal legal methods for 
developing Community policy, the directive is of particular interest. Being binding as to the 
result to be achieved by each Member State to which it is addressed, but leaving to the 
                                                     
1 A decision is binding in its entirety upon those to whom it is addressed. Recommendations and opinions have 
no binding force (Consolidated version EC Treaty, 2002). 
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national authorities the choice of form and methods2, a directive is most suitable for bringing 
about the necessary changes in national laws while respecting as far as possible the national 
legal systems (Prechal, 1995: chap 1). The degree to what Member States actually implement 
agreed Community directives into national law, is monitored by the Commission. The 
implementation deficits these six-monthly monitors display, stand for the percentage of 
Internal Market directives, which, at the time of monitoring, have not yet been notified as 
having been transposed, in relation to the total number of applicable Internal Market 
directives. Hence, these monitors fall short if the aim is to get a sound grasp of Member 
States’ performance in the long run. A recent publication of Mastenbroek (2003), who was the 
first in challenging the EU Internal Market scoreboard outcomes by seriously evaluating the 
transposition performance of the Netherlands, proves that the Commission highly 
underestimates the transposition deficit in terms of timeliness. While the Autumn ‘98 Internal 
Market scoreboard assures that no Member State has a transposition deficit exceeding 6.2 per 
cent, herewith presenting The Netherlands (with a deficit of 2.1 per cent) as one of the better 
performers, Mastenbroek’s evaluation shows otherwise. Her assessment of the 
implementation of all (229) EC and Euratom directives enacted from 1995 through 1998 
demonstrates that - in the case of the Netherlands - almost 60 per cent of the directives that 
were enacted in that period, were transposed late. The length of these delays varies, but may 
run to several years (Mastenbroek, 2003: 371). By focusing on all directives in an entire 
policy field, and by evaluating the long-term transposition records of five EU Member States 
instead of one, I aim to contribute to a better understanding of the transposition deficit.  
 
1.2 Non-compliance: As many explanations as studies 
Secondly, and more importantly, my research is aimed at explaining why it is that Member 
States don’t comply with a directive’s transposition deadline or fail to meet up with the 
directives’ original intentions. Thus far, scholarly efforts to account for the varying degree to 
which Member States comply with EU legislation have not resulted in an unequivocal 
explanation. Most comparative studies on Member States’ adaptation to Community 
legislation took the form of the case study method. Some were especially interested in 
environmental policies (Héritier, 1995; Knill and Lenschow, 1998; Haverland, 1998), whereas 
                                                     
2 It does not mean that directives are vague. The ends to be met by Member States are set out in considerable 
detail, whereas the consequentiality of this instrument has been enforced by ECJ decisions2 (Craig & De Burca 
2003, p 114-15). 
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other scholars have been focusing on directives in the area of equal treatment (Caporaso and 
Jupille 2001; Duina 1999; Eylenbosch and Verreth, 1996; Ostner and Lewis, 1995; Van 
Vleuten, 2001), health and safety at work (Eichener 1995; Gier 1991), European work 
councils (Geyer and Springer 1998; Streeck 1997), and labour law (Falkner et al. 2002, 2003). 
Though most of these studies include the transposition and implementation stage, their 
empirical theoretical focus, looking at just a few directives and/or concentrating on just a few 
countries, is rather narrow. Hence, empirical research on EU Member States’ responses to EU 
law imposed on them, has led to ad hoc explanations, varying per issue or policy area.  Some 
emphasis is found on studies in which adjustment processes are expected to be more 
problematic if the degree of misfit between European rules and existing institutional and 
regulatory traditions is high. Caporaso and Jupille, for instance, assessed the goodness of fit3 
between Europe and domestic provisions, hereby focusing on the adaptation of France and the 
United Kingdom to the EU equal pay and equal treatment legislation. Their study shows that 
European policies and institutions run up against domestic structures, often creating confusion 
and conflict. The resulting process of adaptation is highly political, an outcome broadly 
supportive of historical institutionalism (Caporaso and Jupille, 2001). Mastenbroek, who 
chose for a quantitative approach using survival analysis, concludes that there are - apart from 
the goodness of fit - other important explanatory variables that substantially increase the 
conditional probability of transposition. These are the legal instrument used, the lead ministry, 
the EU-decision making procedure, and finally the mere passage of time and the prospect of 
the deadline being missed4 (Mastenbroek, 2003: 391). Another extensive comparative 
program has been realised by the project group headed by Falkner (2002, 2003), whose 
analyses concern the implementation of six labour law directives in fifteen Member States. 
The results presented by Falkner et al challenge the misfit thesis’ expectation that national 
actors deliberately offer resistance during the transposition phase if European directives 
require significant changes to the pre-existing national arrangements. Their findings indicate 
that opposition is not the only factor that explains Member States’ non-compliance; 
                                                     
3 Here fit is “good” to the extent that substantive equality (e.g. pay equality between men and women) in the 
Member States satisfies the expectations and requirements of European policy and law. Other indicators concern 
how European and national levels define terms such as ‘’equal”,  “pay”, “treatment”, “work”, and “value”. To 
the extent that they are defined similarly in the two spheres, fit is good and adaptational pressure will be 
relatively low. Another indicator concerns the extent to which domestic procedures (avenues for legal recourse 
to perceived victims of discrimination, job-evaluation schemes facilitating the comparison of the value of 
different jobs and provisions) satisfy the requirements of European law.  
4 The residual analysis performed by Mastenbroek indicates that the applied model tells only part of the story.  
The model fails to explain those cases with a large delay, which may be either due to a variable that is omitted 
(f.e. political opposition) or by the weak operationalisation of (presumably) the goodness of fit (Mastenbroek 
2003). 
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administrative shortcomings, interpretation problems, and issue linkage should be taken into 
account as well. Treib5 (2003) on the other hand stresses the importance of domestic party 
politics when it comes to the causal conditions for correct and timely transposition of these 
directives.  
 
2. Trial of strength: comparing the explanatory power of new institutionalist 
theories        
Considering the lack of convergence in explaining Member States’ varying compliance 
records, it is my aim to test the explanatory power of hypotheses deriving from two rival new-
institutional strands - sociological institutionalism and rational choice institutionalism.  All 
new-institutionalist approaches share the core assumption that institutions affect the outcomes 
of political processes. Yet, different scholars perceive the influence of institutions on social 
action in seemingly incompatible ways. In the sociological view policymaking is seen as 
driven by rules of appropriate or exemplary behaviour, organized into structures of identities 
and institutions. Its basic principle is that institutions are defined by behaviour and 
subsequently institutions shape behaviour assuming that individuals “internalise” the 
institution(s) (Peters 1999, chap 6). Interests and identities are considered to be endogenous to 
the processes of interaction that institutions represent. The rational choice perspective, on the 
other hand, argues that individuals have a fixed (exogenous, determined prior to participation) set 
of preferences (Peters 1999, chap 3). Its adherents maintain a relatively thin theory of human 
rationality. They assume that the behaviour of actors is driven by a strategic calculus so as to 
maximize the attainment of these preferences, which will be deeply affected by the actor’s 
expectations about the behaviour of others. One could argue that such a theoretical distinction 
fails to fully represent reality. For instance, March and Olsen (1998: 952) point out that 
political actors are constituted both by their interests, by which they evaluate their expected 
consequences, and by the rules embedded in their identities and political institutions. 
However, from an analytical perspective, such an over-encompassing approach would fail to 
bring to the light the relative weight of the rational and sociological institutional approaches.  
 
3. Research design 
                                                     
5 Case studies in which the transposition of six labour-law directives in four Member States5 were at the centre 
(Treib 2003). 
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For answering the central research questions, my research will concentrate on the 
transposition records of five Member States in the field of European social policy. The 
selection of the policy field as well as the selection of countries - Germany, Greece, the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Spain - is based on their contrasting institutional 
features. Variations between the different policy issues addressed by European social policy, 
and variations between the institutional settings of the Member States allows for testing 
contrasting predictions that can be derived from the sociological and the rational choice 
perspectives.  
 
The data that have been collected through official EU and national sources include details of 
all (over hundred) social policy directives that have been enacted since the establishment of 
the EC, as well as official transposition statistics of the five countries. Hence, the data allow 
for an evaluation of the individual transposition records of EU Member States over time, in 
terms of timeliness and completeness of transposition. Moreover, the data allow for a 
quantitative testing of hypotheses. The data collection method as regards the explanatory 
variables highly depends on the operationalisation of hypotheses that I choose to test, but may 
involve document studies, interviews, and/or structured surveys.  
 
Hence, the first step towards a theoretical trial of strength is to make an inventory of the 
quantifiable implications of (a) sociological institutionalism and (b) rational choice 
institutionalism. Hypotheses deriving from both theories will be tested by means of 
multivariate analysis methods. In a later stage, elements deriving from the historical 
institutional strand may be added to improve the explanatory capacity of the former two 
theories. Finally, and subsequent to establishing which theory proofs to be most successful in 
answering the main research question, I aim to examine by means of case studies the a-typical 
conditions of cases which are left unexplained by the theory, and whether or not these special 
cases give cause for refining the theory.  
 
4. Sociological Institutionalism and its Logic of Appropriateness - possible hypotheses 
I conclude this paper with a selection of hypotheses, which I consider most capable of relating 
the sociological institutional “logic of appropriateness” to the transposition process.  
 
While assessing possible hypotheses proposed in literature (f.e. Checkel, Beyers and Trondal, 
I took a particular interest in inferences of which it is reasonable to expect that the institution 
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assumed to be in force indeed varies within the research population. Moreover, such causal 
inferences should contain explanatory variables that allow for a quantitative approach. Apart 
from these criteria, an equally decisive factor giving ground for adopting a hypothesis is its 
accurate coverage of the theoretical core assumptions. In other words, those hypotheses that I 
considered relatively less accurate in doing so, have been abandoned. Moreover, if reasoning 
from the sociological perspective, I expect that national key actors’ preference change 
towards an increased compliance with EU-norms, and consequently towards timely and 
complete transposition of EU law, is founded on a process of successively  
- Institutional embeddedness, which implies in this case: getting embedded in a EU 
institution;     
- Identification with the EU institution  
- Social learning, and subsequently internalisation, acceptance and diffusion of EU norms6 
- Adoption (by national key actors) of a predominant preference for EU norms and 
consequently preferential acceptance and treatment of EU norms, as opposed to possible 
contradicting norms that rule the national institutions in which they are embedded as well.   
 
Considering the importance of these subsequent phases, and following the selection criteria I 
discussed earlier in this section, the set of hypotheses that I intend to test read as follows: 
  
H1 A directive is likely to be transposed timely and completely if the department is not 
divided along functional or professional lines but has a flexible structure of 
coordination allowing officials who negotiate in Brussels to participate in transposition 
domestically, provided that  
 
- These officials participate in a group that meets repeatedly or [if] there is high 
density of interaction    
 
 - Apart from this department, no other domestic departments (with a less 
flexible structure of coordination) are involved in the transposition process 
 
H2 The more the domestic political environment is featured by distrust in the domestic 
polity, the more likely national officials will adopt a predominant preference for EU 
norms and consequently seek to transpose directives timely and correctly  





Beyers, J. and Trondal, J., (2003). How Nation-States ‘hit’ Europe. Ambiguity and Representation in the 
European Union. European Integrationonline Papers, Vol. 7 No. 5. 
Caporaso, J. and Jupille J (2001). The Europeanization of Gender Equality Policy and Domestic Structural 
Change, in Cowles, Maria Green, James Caporaso, and Thomas Risse, 2001: Transforming Europe - 
Europeanization and Domestic Change, 21-44. 
Checkel, Jeffrey, T. (2001). Constructing European institutions, in Schneider, G. and M. Aspinwall, The Rules 
of Integration: Institutionalist approaches to the study of Europe Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
pp.19-39. 
Checkel, J. T. (2001). A constructivist research program in EU studies? Forum section, European Union Politics, 
2, 2, 219-249. 
 
Celex online database. 
Duina, F.G. (1999). Harmonizing Europe: National-States within the Common Market. Albay: State University 
of New York. 
Eichener, V. (1995) European Health and Safety Regulation: No "Race to the Bottom"', in B. Unger and F. van 
Waarden (eds) Convergence or Diversity? Internationalization and Economic Policy Response. Aldershot: 
Avebury. 
European Commission (1998). Single Market scoreboard no. 3. Brussels. 
European Commission (2003). Internal Market scoreboard no. 12. Brussels. 
European Commission (2004). Internal Market scoreboard no. 13. Brussels. 
Eylenbosch, A. and Verreth, K. (1996). Equal treatment for men and women in complementary pensions: 
answers or unresolved questions?  Journal of European Social Policy, 1996/2, 123-146. 
Falkner, G., Treib O., Hartlapp M. and Leiber S. (2002). Opposition through the Backdoor? The Case of 
National Non-Compliance with European Directives. Working Paper Politicial Science Series 83. Vienna: 
Institute for Advanced Studies. 
Falkner, G. (2003). Comparing Europeanisation Effects: From Metaphor to Operationalisation. Paper presented 
at the ECPR General Conference, Marburg, 18-21 September 2003.  
Geyer, R.R. (2000). Exploring European Social Policy. Cambridge: Polity Press; Malden MA 02148 (USA): 
Blackwell Publishers Inc. 
Geyer, R. R. and Springer, B. (1998) EU Social Policy After Maastricht : The Works Council Directive and 
British Opt-Out, in P. Laurent and M. M. (eds) The State of the European Union Volume 4. Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner. 
Gier, H.G. de (1991). Implementation of EC directives on working conditions and product safety: possibilities 
and limitations: report of an international comparison related to France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
United Kingdom, Denmark and The Netherlands. Amsterdam: Hugo Sinzheimer Institute. 
Hall, P. A., and Taylor, R. (1996) Political science and the three institutionalisms. Political Studies 44: 936-57. 
10/18/2004 8
Haverland, M. (1998). National Autonomy, European Integration and the Politics of Packaging Waste. Utrecht, 
Tilburg, Rotterdam and Amsterdam: AWSB 
 
Heritier, A., C. Knill, and S. Mingers. 1996. Ringing the Changes in Europe: Regulatory Competition and 
Redefinition of the State. Britain, France, Germany. Berlin: DeGruyter. 
Knill, C. and A. Lenschow. 1998. Change as "Appropriate Adaptation": Administrative Adjustment to European 
Environmental Policy in Britain and Germany. European Integration Online Papers (EIOP) Vol, 2 (1). Available 
at http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1998-001a.htm. 
March, J.G. and  J.P. Olsen (1998). The institutional dynamics of international political orders. International 
organization 52: 943-69.  
 
Mastenbroek, E. (2003). Surviving the Deadline, the transposition of EU Directives in the Netherlands, in 
European Union Politics, Vol 4 (-4), pp. 371-395. London: Sage Publications 
Ostner, I. and Lewis, J. (1995) Gender and the Evolution of European Social Policy, in S. Leibfried and P. 
Pierson (eds) European social policy: Between fragmentation and integration, pp. 159-93. Washington DC: 
Brookings Institution. 
Peters, B. Guy (1999). Institutional Theory in Political Science; the new institutionalism. London and New York. 
Pinter. 
Prechal, S. (1995). Directives in European Community Law. A Study of Directives and Their Enforcement in 
National Courts. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Treib, O. (2003). Die Umsetzung von EU-Richtlinien im Zeichen der Parteipolitik: Eine akteurzentrierte 
Antwort auf die Misfit-These. In: Politische Vierteljahresschrift 44(4), 506-528. A slightly different version of 
this article has also been published as MPIfG Discussion Paper 03/3. Cologne: Max Planck Institute for the 
Study of Societies. 
Vleuten, J.M. van der (2001). Dure vrouwen, dwarse staten: een institutioneel-realistische visie op de 
totstandkoming en implementatie van Europees beleid. Nijmegen: Nijmegen: Nijmegen University Press. 
10/18/2004 9
